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1 Introduction 
According to probabilistic theories of causation, causes raise the probabilities of their 
effects. Opponents of probabilistic theories of causation offer putative counterexam-
ples. A moment's reflection should lead us to expect such counterexamples to be of 
two types: (1) causes that appear not to raise the probabilities of their effects; and (2) 
events that appear to raise the probabilities of other events, without causing those 
events. Almost all of the cases that have been discussed in the literature have been of 
the first sort; these can be effectively handled using resources that are already avail-
able. Counterexamples of the second sort, which have been largely ignored, still pose 
a threat. I will explore some options for avoiding these counterexamples, and more 
important, argue that they raise fundamental questions about the nature of indeter-
ministic causation~questions that transcend issues about the correctness of any par-
ticular philosophical theory. 
2 Probabilistic Causation 
The motivation for a probabilistic theory of causation lies in the desire to have a 
theory that encompasses causal relationships that are inherently indeterministic or 
"chancy." The central idea behind probabilistic theories of causation is that causes 
raise the probabilities of their effects. Perhaps the simplest and most natural way to 
formulate this idea is in terms of conditional probability. C raises the probability of 
E, and hence C causes E, exactly if P(E/C) > P(E/~C). 
This proposal is subject to a well-known problem. Coughing raises the probability 
of lung cancer: Coughers are more likely to be smokers than are noncoughers, and 
since smokers are more likely to contract lung cancer than nonsmokers, coughers will 
also be more likely to contract lung cancer than noncoughers. Coughing does not, 
however, cause lung cancer~the correlation between coughing and lung cancer is 
spurious. Spurious correlations can give rise to counterexamples of both sorts de-
scribed in the introductory section. 
The standard solution to this problem is to require that causes raise the proba-
bilities of their effects ceteris paribus. There are at least two well-developed ap-
proaches based on this idea. According to one (see, e.g., Cartwright 1979; Skyrms 
1980; Humphreys 1989; Eells 1991), C causes E iff P(E/C&B) > P(E/~C&B), for a 
variety of background conditions B. By conditioning on background conditions, we 
hold fixed the presence or absence of confounding factors. 
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Lewis (1986) analyzes the concept of ceteris paribus probability-raising differently. 
According to his theory, C causes E if the probability that E would occur in the 
actual world, at the time when C occurred, is higher than the probability that E 
would occur at the corresponding time in any of the closest possible worlds in which 
C does not occur. 1 In this theory single-case probabilities in different possible worlds, 
not conditional probabilities, are compared. For example, suppose that Barney 
smokes, coughs, and develops lung cancer. Barney's coughing is a cause of his lung 
cancer if he would have been less likely to contract lung cancer had he not coughed. 
But the relevant counterfactual is false: The closest possible world in which Barney 
does not cough is one in which he nonetheless smokes. In such a world, the proba-
bility of his developing lung cancer remains unchanged. In what follows, I will not 
distinguish between the different methods of articulating the basic probability-raising 
idea unless necessary. 
My focus will be on what I call "actual causation": the relation that holds between 
two particular events when one does, in fact, cause the other. This is to be distin-
guished from the relation that holds when one event has (or is of a type that has) a 
tendency to cause another. 2 As we shall see, the most troubling sort of counter-
example to probabilistic theories of causation threatens only theories of actual cau-
sation. Even if the counterexamples cannot be circumvented, probabilistic theories 
of causal tendencies remain attractive. Unlike some authors (e.g., Sober 1985; Eells 
1991), I find it unpalatable that these are simply two independent causal relations: 
Surely whether one event did in fact cause another has a great deal to do with 
whether the one (was of a type that) had a tendency to cause the other (see Hitchcock 
1995a for further discussion). This leaves us with good reason to continue pursuing 
probabilistic theories of causation even in the face of the difficulties discussed below. 
3 Making It the Hard Way 
Many authors have argued that there are examples in which a cause lowers the 
probability of its effect, even when one holds other factors fixed. Perhaps the most 
famous example, due originally to Deborah Rosen, is presented in Suppes (1970). 
(See also Salmon 1984, chapter 7.) A golfer lines up to drive her ball, but her swing 
is off and she badly slices the ball, sending it on a trajectory well to the right of the 
hole. Her slice decreases the probability that it will land in the cup for a hole-in-one. 
By chance, however, the ball bounces off a tree trunk at just the right angle to send it 
on a trajectory back toward the cup. As it happened, her slice did cause the ball to go 
into the cup, even though the slice lowered the probability of this outcome. 
Do All and Only Causes Raise the Probabilities of Effects? 405 
This sort of example has received considerable attention. I will present only the 
solution that I favor. Probabilistic theories of causation require that we compare the 
probability of the effect in the presence of the cause, and also in its absence. But a 
cause may be absent in many ways. For example, our golfing heroine might have hit 
the ball squarely, hooked the ball to her left, or barely nicked the ball (causing it to 
move hardly at all); her swing might have been so bad that she missed the ball com-
pletely, or she might have refrained from swinging. These are all ways in which she 
might not have sliced the ball. The intuition appealed to in the previous paragraph, 
that the slice lowered the probability that the ball would land in the cup, suggests 
that the relevant alternative is the one where she hits the ball squarely. But why 
should this be so? Perhaps the relevant alternative is the one in which the golfer 
refrains from swinging altogether; relative to such an alternative, the slice actually 
increases the probability of a hole-in-one. My view (developed in Hitchcock 1993, 
1996a, b) is that there is no objectively correct alternative for purposes of probability 
comparison. Rather, causal claims are contrastive in nature; they are true or false 
relative to a specific alternative. Thus, the golfer's slice caused the hole-in-one, rela-
tive to the alternative in which she abstains from swinging, but not relative to the 
alternative in which she hits it squarely. In the latter case, we say that the ball landed 
in the cup despite the badly sliced shot. 
There are a number of advantages to this approach. First, it avoids the need to 
select a privileged alternative from among the many alternatives to the candidate 
cause. Second, it can accommodate the seemingly incompatible judgments that "the 
golfer's slice caused the hole-in-one" and "the ball landed in the cup despite the 
badly sliced shot" are both true causal claims. We can accept both claims because we 
can hear them (perhaps with the help of a pragmatic rule of accommodation) as 
being made relative to different alternatives. Third, the relativity of causal claims to 
specific alternatives can account for a curious linguistic feature of causal claims. To 
borrow an example from Dretske (1977b), suppose that Susan has stolen a bicycle, 
resulting in her arrest. We might agree that Susan's stealing the bicycle caused her to 
be arrested, while denying that Susan's stealing the bicycle caused her to be arrested. 
The placement of stress in a causal claim can affect its truth value. According to 
the proposed view, the different placement of stress points to different alternatives. 
Susan's stealing the bicycle caused her to be arrested relative to alternatives in which 
she acquired a bicycle by some other means, but not relative to alternatives in which 
she stole some other item. 
I conclude that putative counterexamples involving probability-lowering causes 
can be eliminated using a refinement to probabilistic theories of causation that is 
motivated on a number of independent grounds. 
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4 Three Scenarios 
Peter Menzies (1989a, 1996) describes a case involving causal preemption in which 
a probability-raising event is not a cause. He takes such cases to be isolated and 
atypical: 3 "It is striking how a probabilistic theory of causation, appropriately for-
mulated, follows the contours of our intuitive conception of causation with amazing 
accuracy-with the exception of the problem cases to do with pre-emption and over-
determination" (Menzies 1996, p. 100). 
In fact, however, preemption is in no way essential to Menzies's example. 
James Woodward (1990) describes a case with the following structure. Suppose that 
C1 and C2 both increase the probability of E, and would do so regardless of whether 
the other is present or not. On some particular occasion, C1, C2, and E occur. 
Although both C1 and C2 are potential causes of E, could it not be the case that in 
fact only C2 causes E on this particular occasion? That is, couldn't this be one of 
those cases where C1 fails to cause E, not because it is preempted, but simply be-
cause its operation is chancy? If so, then C1 raises the probability of E without 
causing it. 4 
Woodward offers the following more specific example in a review of Humphreys 
(1989): 
Scenario 1: Suppose we know ... that each of two different carcinogenic materials C1 and C2 
[e.g., gyromitrin and diazonium metabolite] can cause [stomach tumors] in mice (E). Suppose 
also that the operation of each of these causes is non-deterministic but governed by a stable 
probability distribution: each increases the probability of cancer, although to some value 
strictly less than one. Suppose also that there is no evidence for any interaction effect between 
C1 and C2 when both are present. Now suppose that a particular mouse is exposed to ... C1 
and C2 and develops cancer E. It follows on Humphreys' account that since both C1 and C2 
increase the possibility of cancer, both cause or have causally contributed to cancer. But why 
should we believe this? How do we know that the cancer was not instead caused by C1 alone 
or C2 alone? We know that when ... C1 occur[s] in isolation (without ... C2) ... , it is perfectly 
possible for [it] to increase the probability ... of E and yet ... fail to cause ... E. Here proba-
bility increase is not sufficient for actual ... causation. How do we know that the envisioned 
case is not also one of these cases, in which C1 fails to cause E ... and E is instead caused by 
C2 [alone]? (Woodward 1994, p. 366; with minor changes in notation. Woodward notes that 
the example is originally due to Humphreys 1989, p. 15) 
The potentially troublesome implication-that both carcinogens caused the stom-
ach tumor-is not unique to Humphreys's theory, but it is shared by all of the 
probabilistic approaches to singular causation mentioned above. Note that the as-
sumption of indeterminism is essential to the example. If, given the relevant back-
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ground conditions, the presence of diazonium metabolite increases the probability 
of stomach tumor to 1, then the presence of gyromitrin cannot further raise the 
probability. 
Is Woodward's scenario coherent? Could it be that only one of the carcinogens 
actually causes the stomach tumor? Consider two potential analogues. 
Scenario 2 Maria and Lucinda are neighbors. Every week, each of them buys a 
one-dollar ticket for the state lottery, which pays one million dollars as the grand 
prize. Due to the diminishing marginal utility of money, Lucinda and Maria decide 
that they would each rather have two chances at half a million dollars than one 
chance at a million, and so they decide to pool their resources. Each of them buys a 
ticket as before, but under the agreement that the prize money will be shared if either 
of them wins. In fact, Maria's ticket wins, and the neighbors split the million-dollar 
prize. 
Scenario 3 Desmond and James decide to do something similar. They walk to the 
store together, slap their dollars down simultaneously, and purchase two tickets, each 
registered in both names. In fact, one of those tickets wins, and the two men share a 
million dollars. 
In each scenario, how might we address the question: whose dollar purchased the 
winning ticket? Although the two women shared the money as agreed, and although 
each ticket increased the chance that the prize would be won, there is still a fact of 
the matter as to whose dollar had been converted to one million: It was Maria's. In 
scenario 3, however, there is no such fact. Although only one of the tickets actually 
won, there is no fact of the matter about whose dollar had actually purchased this 
ticket. 
Probabilistic theories of causation presuppose that indeterministic causation works 
on analogy with the third scenario. Various causes increase the probability of an ef-
fect by contributing to a "probability pool." Once the probability of the effect is de-
termined, the dice are cast, and the event either occurs or it does not. The individual 
causes make no additional contribution to the outcome; they bring it about (or not) 
only via their contribution to the probability pool. David Lewis and Paul Hum-
phreys both defend the analogy between scenario 1 and scenario 3. Humphreys 
( 1989) discusses scenario 1 explicitly: 
In the example at hand, the situation with both carcinogens present is different from the situ-
ation with only one-the chance is higher than with either alone because both chemicals have 
contributed to the value of that chance. And that is all there is. To think otherwise is to con-
ceive of the example in terms of a deterministic image where the tumor was "entirely caused" 
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by the first chemical and the second chemical was thereby irrelevant. But that is not the situa-
tion. The second chemical is not irrelevant on this (or any other) occasion for it contributes to 
the chance on this occasion, as does the first chemical, and after they have done this, nothing 
else causal happens. It is ... a matter of sheer chance whether the tumor occurs or not. (pp. 
36-37) 
Lewis rejects an analogous counterexample: "[T]he objection presupposes that the 
case must be of one kind or the other: either E definitely would have occurred with-
out C2, or it definitely would not have occurred without C2. But I reject the presup-
position that there are two different ways the world could be, giving us one definite 
counterfactual or the other ... " (Lewis 1986, p. 180, with minor modifications in 
notation). Both writers articulate a picture of probabilistic causation in which causes 
bring about their effects only via their contributions to a probability pool. 
At issue is not merely the correctness of the probabilistic approach to causation-
although that is important in itself-but how we are to conceive of indeterministic 
causation in general. This has implications that extend beyond metaphysics into risk 
analysis and tort law. Suppose, for example, that a pregnant woman is exposed to a 
particular teratogen, which increases the probability that her child will possess a 
particular kind of birth defect (which may also occur in the absence of the teratogen). 
Assume, moreover, that these are objective probabilities and do not merely reflect 
our ignorance about background conditions. If the birth defect occurs, is there a re-
sidual issue of whether it was caused by the teratogen, and hence of whether the 
woman may be entitled to receive payment for damages? American tort law answers 
in the affirmative, but it is plausible that this answer is founded on a denial of the 
assumption that the underlying probabilities are objective and not merely epistemic. 
If the relationship between exposure to the teratogen and the formation of birth 
defects is indeterministic, however, current jurisprudence may be deeply misguided 
on this issue. This critique of existing tort law is carried out in some detail by Para-
scondola (1996), although he assumes without argument that scenario 1 assimilates 
to scenario 3. 
Although the intuitions of the opposing camps are clear, the case seems inconclu-
sive. In particular, our immediate reaction to scenario 1 is to request more informa-
tion. By what mechanism do the tumors form? How was the mouse exposed to the 
carcinogens? Which molecules of which substance made contact with which tissue 
cells? Which cells are the tumorous ones? And so on. In the absence of such further 
information, we have no clear intuitions about whether this case assimilates to sce-
nario 2 or scenario 3. It will thus be helpful to examine some further examples that 
elicit clearer intuitions. 
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5 Three More Scenarios 
Consider three more examples in which two potential causes are present and an effect 
occurs. 
Scenario 4 Suppose that a source emits polarized photons where the angle of po-
larization depends on the physical configuration of the source. The emitted photons 
then strike a polarizer that is aligned so that horizontally polarized photons are 
transmitted. Initially, the source is configured so as to emit vertically polarized pho-
tons; any such photon will be absorbed by the polarizer. Now suppose that Juan and 
Jennifer simultaneously push the source, each pushing it with a force sufficient to 
rotate the apparatus through 30°. The source emits a photon, which now has a 
probability of sin2(60°) = 0.75 of being transmitted by the polarizer, and the photon 
is in fact transmitted. 
In this scenario, each push increased the probability that the photon would be 
transmitted. It seems clearly wrongheaded to ask whether the transmission was really 
due to Juan's push rather than Jennifer's push. Rather, this case seems to fit the 
model of probabilistic causality described by Humphreys and Lewis: Each push 
increased the probability of the effect (the transmission of the photon), and then it 
was simply a matter of chance. There are no causal facts of the matter extending 
beyond the probabilistic contribution made by each. This is a very simple case in 
which our intuitions are not clouded by tacit deterministic assumptions. If this case 
is typical of genuine indeterministic causation, then the sort of case envisaged by 
Woodward would indeed be incoherent. 
Scenario 5 also supports this conclusion: 
Scenario 5 A series of identical ropes are tied to a wall, and it is determined that 
when either Gene or Pat pulls on a rope as hard as possible for ten seconds, there is a 
fifty percent chance that the rope will break. When both pull on a rope for ten sec-
onds, there is a seventy-five percent chance that it will break. On a given occasion, 
both pull and the rope does break. (Woodward, personal communication.) 
Once again, our intuition is that it would be wrongheaded to say that on this 
occasion the breaking of the rope is due to the pull of Gene rather than Pat or 
vice versa. This example is less esoteric than the previous one, although we currently 
have no principled reason to think that in a scenario such as this, the probabilities 
would be irreducible and have this structure. This is a common problem in dis-
cussions of indeterministic causation: The only examples in which we have prin-
cipled reasons for thinking that there are irreducible probabilities having a certain 
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structure involve microphysics, where our normal causal intuitions begin to lose their 
moorings. 
Scenario 6 spells trouble. 
Scenario 6 Suppose that two gunmen are shooting at a Ming vase. Each one has a 
fifty percent chance of hitting the vase, and each one shoots independently, so the 
probability that the vase shatters is 0.75. (For simplicity, we will ignore the possibil-
ity that the vase might survive a bullet hit.) As it happens, the first gunman's shot hits 
the vase, but the second gunman misses. 
In this example, the second gunman shot at the vase, his shooting increased the 
probability that the vase would shatter (from 0.5 to 0.75), and the vase did in fact 
shatter. Nonetheless, it seems clear that we should not say that the second gunman's 
shot caused the vase to shatter. So here we have an apparent counterexample to 
probabilistic theories of causation: The second shot increased the probability that 
the vase would shatter, but it did not cause the vase to shatter. This example has the 
same structure as Woodward's, but here it is clear that the effect is due to one of the 
probability-raising factors, and not to the other. The two gunshots do not simply 
contribute to the probability of the vase's shattering, after which "nothing else causal 
happens." Something else causal does happen: The bullet fired from the first gun 
strikes the vase, while the bullet from the second gun misses. Note that this example 
threatens only probabilistic accounts of actual causation. This example would not 
lead us to withdraw the causal tendency claim that shooting at vases causes them to 
shatter. Likewise, even if Woodward's intuitions about scenario 1 are correct, that 
would nat lead us to deny that gyromitrin or diazonium metabolite tend to cause 
stomach tumors. 
In the next three sections, I will discuss prospects for replying to this counterex-
ample. The results will be seen to be inconclusive: although no line of response suf-
fers a knockout blow, none is wholly persuasive, either. In particular, many of the 
responses to be considered must postulate further empirical facts, beyond those pre-
sented above. While we do not know for sure that those facts do not obtain, we 
readily judge that the second shooter did not cause the vase to shatter without asking 
whether such facts obtain. Moreover, the facts adduced are sufficiently esoteric that it 
is implausible that our judgment about this case tacitly presupposes them. 
6 Causal Processes 
The shattering of the vase can be traced back to the firing of the first shooter's gun 
via the bullet that was fired from his gun, whereas there is no analogous process 
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connecting the second shooter to the target. It is natural to point to this asymmetry 
in judging that the firing of one of the guns, but not the other, was a cause of the 
vase's shattering. 
Spatiotemporal causal processes, such as the speeding bullets of scenario 6, play a 
central role in Salmon's (1984) theory of causation (see also Dowe 1992; Salmon 
1994). It is not clear, however, how the appeal to causal processes can resolve our 
problem. There are processes connecting the second shooter to the vase: photons and 
sound waves, for example. Intuitively, these are not processes of the right sort. Un-
fortunately, causal process theories such as Salmon's do not have the resources to 
formulate the distinction between causal processes "of the right sort" and those "of 
the wrong sort"; at the very least, such a distinction will presuppose something like 
the probabilistic theory of causation that is at issue. Thus, for example, if we try to 
get around this problem by saying that there must be a connecting process that 
transmits a sufficient quantity of energy to shatter the vase, we must then address the 
question of what constitutes a sufficient amount of energy. The answer to this ques-
tion will almost certainly have to be formulated in terms of counterfactuals or ceteris 
paribus conditional probabilities. 5 
In any event, there are reasons that mitigate against requiring that causation al-
ways involve connection via continuous processes. Suppose that a gunman fires at a 
human target, but a secret service agent jumps in front of the gunman's bullet, 
allowing herself to be hit by it. The agent's brave action caused the target to remain 
alive, even though there are no processes connecting the agent and the target (except 
for irrelevant ones such as sound waves and photons). 6 A probabilistic theory of 
causation thus cannot be saved by adding the simple requirement that causes be 
connected to their effects by continuous processes. 
7 Precise Specification of Events 
Consider the following scenario: 
Scenario 7 Barney smokes, and he also spends a lot of time in the sun. These two 
proclivities are not connected; for example, Barney is not forced to go outside in 
order to smoke. Barney's smoking increases the probability that he will get lung 
cancer. By increasing his probability of getting lung cancer, Barney's smoking 
increases the overall probability that he will suffer from some form of cancer, and 
analogously for his exposure to the sun. In fact, Barney develops skin cancer. A for-
tiori, Barney develops cancer of some form or other. 
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Since Barney's smoking increased the probability that he would develop cancer of 
some sort, and Barney did indeed develop cancer, probabilistic theories of causation 
would seem to rule that his smoking caused him to develop cancer. But this seems 
clearly wrong: Barney's cancer is skin cancer, not lung cancer, so it was not caused 
by his smoking. Although both smoking and sun exposure increased the probability 
that he would develop cancer, only Barney's exposure to the sun actually caused him 
to get cancer. 
Few philosophers would be troubled by this prima facie counterexample to prob-
abilistic theories of causation. Our first reaction is that such theories yield the 
wrong verdict only because we have described the effect-Barney's getting cancer-
imprecisely. There is a more detailed level of description-Barney's contracting skin 
cancer-where probabilistic theories render the correct verdict: Barney's smoking did 
not raise the probability of skin cancer, and hence it did not cause Barney's skin 
cancer. 
Let us formulate the general principle that seems to be at work here: 
(PSE) Suppose that on a particular occasion, events occur that instantiate types C 
and E. Even if, relative to the relevant background conditions, C raises the 
probability of E, if there are more precise specifications of the events in question, C' 
and E', such that C' does not raise the probability of E', then we should not say 
that C causes E. 
How, precisely, one ought to formulate this principle of the precise specification of 
events will depend on one's theory of events-! will leave it to the reader to refor-
mulate (PSE) in accord with her favorite theory of events. 
Perhaps appeal to (PSE) will enable us to avoid the counterexample of the second 
shooter. Although the firing of the second shot increased the probability that the vase 
would shatter, there may exist a more precise specification of the outcome (say, 
involving the shattering into very small pieces of a certain region of the vase directly 
facing the first shooter) such that the second shot did not increase its probability. 7 
But although (PSE) seems to provide a natural diagnosis of scenario 7, it does not 
seem to get at our reasons for saying that the first gunman's shot caused the vase to 
shatter, while the second gunman's shot did not. Moving from the description "Bar-
ney's cancer" to the more specific "Barney's skin cancer" seems wholly natural, 
whereas the move from "the vase's shattering" to the more detailed level of descrip-
tion seems ad hoc. 
Moreover, the application of (PSE) in this case involves an empirical presupposi-
tion: that there is some level of description such that the second gunman's shot made 
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no difference whatsoever to the probability that the vase would shatter in just that 
way. Perhaps the second gunman's shot did increase the probability, ever so slightly, 
that the vase would shatter in precisely the manner that it did. If so, (PSE) will be of 
no avail. If (PSE) succeeds at all, then, it will succeed because of empirical facts we 
have no (current) warrant for accepting, and which appear to play no role in our 
straightforward causal judgments about scenario 6. 
8 Ebb and Flow in the Probability Pool 
There is one regard in which scenarios 4 and 6 are significantly different. In scenario 
4, both Juan and Jennifer push the polarizer, yielding a 0.75 probability that the 
photon will be transmitted. Nothing further happens to affect the probability of 
transmission once the position of the polarizer is set. This fits nicely with the proba-
bility pool conception of indeterministic causation: The two pushes determine the 
probability of transmission, and nothing else causal happens-transmission follows 
by sheer chance. Time is not literally discrete in this scenario, but it might as well be. 
It is implausible that scenario 6 works in this way: We do not imagine that the two 
guns fire, fixing the probability of shattering at 0.75 until the very moment of shat-
tering. Rather, we imagine that the actual trajectory followed by the bullets depends 
on random gusts of wind, fluctuations of air pressure, or perhaps even on indeter-
ministic fluctuations intrinsic to the bullets themselves. The initial 0.5 probability 
that each shot will hit the target is an average over all of these possibilities. As the 
bullets speed through the air, the probability that each one will hit the vase does not 
remain frozen at 0.5, but changes in response to indeterministic events that occur 
after the guns were fired. The probability pool does not remain calm, but rises and 
falls as probability flows in and out. 
In cases such as that described in scenario 6, there may be a vast number of inter-
mediate events whose chance occurrence will affect the probability of the outcome. 
Perhaps a probabilistic theory of causation that is sensitive to the ebb and flow of 
the probability of shattering after the two shots are fired could yield the right ver-
dict about scenario 6. Such theories have been offered by Kvart (1997, inter alia), 
Menzies (1989a, but repudiated in 1996), and Eells (1991, chapter 6). I will not 
describe each of these theories in detail, but will rather focus on the features of the 
probability pool that they might exploit in dealing with the case of the two gunmen. 
Suppose that there is some time t before the shattering of the vase, such that the 
trajectory of the bullet from second gun at t gives it no chance of hitting the vase: 
Although the bullet from the second gun emerged from the barrel with a probability 
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of 0.5 of hitting the vase, by time t, random changes in the bullet's trajectory have 
put it on a path that will definitely steer clear of the vase. Then, the probability at t 
that the vase will shatter is exactly the same as it would have been had the second 
gunman never fired. Under this supposition, the accounts of Menzies (1989a) and 
Eells (1991) correctly rule that second gunman's shot did not cause the vase to shat-
ter. I will not defend these claims in detail here, but will instead focus on a simpler 
proposal suggested by Hall (personal communication). Hall recommends a minor 
modification of Lewis's counterfactual theory of causation: Instead of requiring 
that causes raise the probability of their effects at the time the cause occurs, we 
must require that causes raise the probabilities of their effects shortly before the time 
at which the effect occurs. In the case at hand, the probability at time t that the 
vase will shatter would have been no different if the second gunman had never 
fired; hence Hall's proposal rules that the second gunman's shot is not a cause of the 
shattering. 
Another possibility emerges if instead we focus on the trajectory of the first bullet. 
Suppose now that there is some time t at which the bullet fired from the first gun is 
determined to hit the vase. If we hold fixed the trajectory of this bullet at time t, then 
the firing of the second gun no longer makes a difference to the probability of shat-
tering: The probability is 1 either way. This move is not ad hoc: The trajectory of the 
first bullet at time tis a cause of shattering, and so should (according to many prob-
abilistic theories of causation) be held fixed when evaluating the probabilistic rele-
vance of the second gunman's shot. If the trajectory of the first bullet at timet is held 
fixed, the second gunman's shot no longer raises the probability of shattering; hence, 
a sufficiently refined probabilistic theory of causation correctly rules that the second 
shot is not a cause of shattering. 
While these approaches hold out some promise for handling the case of the second 
shooter, each of them requires assumptions about the probabilistic details that were 
not included in the original description of the scenario. If the probability that the first 
bullet will miss the vase or that the second bullet will hit remains positive right up 
until the time of shattering, the proposed resolutions will not succeed. 8 Although the 
probabilistic assumptions discussed above are not altogether implausible, our igno-
rance about such matters of probabilistic detail surely outstrips our ignorance of the 
causal relations in scenario 6. Our intuition that the first shot caused the shattering 
and the second did not does not depend on such probabilistic details. It is particu-
larly troubling that the proposals discussed in sections 7 and 8 presuppose that cer-
tain probabilities take on values of 0 and 1. One of the motivations for developing 
probabilistic theories of causation was the thought that the world, for all we know, 
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might be indeterministic. It might, for all we know, be thoroughly indeterministic; 
perhaps everything is possible, no matter how improbable. Surely we should want 
our probabilistic theories of causation to apply in such a world as well. 
9 The Last Scenario 
I present for consideration a final scenario. 
Scenario 8 A box contains two carbon-14 atoms, and a very sensitive detector is 
placed near the box. The presence of each atom increases the probability that a decay 
event will be detected during some given time interval. In fact, a decay event is de-
tected, and one of the atoms in the box is now a nitrogen atom. 
Intuitively it seems that it was the presence of one atom (the one that is now ani-
trogen atom), and not the other, that caused the detection event. 9 Yet in this sce-
nario, none of the maneuvers canvased in sections 6 through 8 seems possible. Is this, 
at long last, a clean counterexample to probabilistic theories of causation? 
We must proceed with caution here, for we are within the realm of the notorious 
measurement problem of quantum mechanics. There are many interpretations of 
what is going on in this example, no one of them universally accepted. As it turns 
out, those interpretations that lend themselves to the natural conclusion that it is the 
presence of one atom and not the other that caused the detection event tend not to be 
the ones that close the door on the various maneuvers described above. Suppose we 
understand the decay event in terms of a realist, or hidden-variable interpretation 
(such as that of Bohm 1952). In this case, one of the atoms decays at some time prior 
to the detection event, and a decay particle travels to the detector. There is a spatia-
temporally contiguous process (the decay particle) connecting the atom to the detec-
tor, and there is a more detailed specification of the detection event available (one 
including hidden variables). 
Suppose, by contrast, that we understand this scenario in terms of a more tra-
ditional Copenhagen-style interpretation. The atoms enter into superpositions of 
decayed and undecayed states, thus bringing about a certain probability that a mea-
surement will reveal that a decay event has occurred. When the measurement is per-
formed, the superposition collapses and a decay is in fact detected. On this picture, 
the detection of the decay particle is not a distinct event from the decay event itself. 
As an indeterministic result of that decay /detection event, one of the atoms is now a 
nitrogen atom. The decay of that atom is better thought of as a part of the mea-
surement interaction than as a cause of it. 
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This is not an exhaustive partition of possible interpretations of scenario 8, of 
course; but it should suffice to convince us that this is the wrong place to look for a 
trouble-free counterexample to probabilistic theories of causation. 
10 Conclusion 
Note that our question is not one of epistemology~how do we know in cases like 
scenario 6 which potential cause is an actual cause? We do know~otherwise the 
counterexamples would have no force. In scenario 6, we know that the second gun-
shot did not cause the vase to shatter because the two events were not connected by 
an appropriate type of spatiotemporal process. In scenario 7, we know that Barney's 
smoking did not cause his cancer because Barney developed skin cancer, and that is 
not the sort of cancer that smoking causes. In scenario 8 (assuming some realistic 
interpretation of atomic decay), we know that the presence of one atom but not the 
other caused the detection event, because atoms cause detection events by decaying, 
and atoms that decay are transformed from an atom of one type to another. In each 
case, there is a marker that distinguishes the genuine cause from the spurious proba-
bility-raiser.10 But as metaphysicians, we are interested in providing a general theory 
of causation. The markers described above are heterogeneous in nature: in scenario 
6, the marker resides in events intermediate between the putative cause and its puta-
tive effect; in scenario 7, it is the nature of the effect itself that marks the actual cause; 
in scenario 8, a separate effect (the transformation of the decaying atom) marks 
the actual cause of the detection event. For a theory of causation to exploit these 
markers, something more must be said about what they have in common in virtue of 
which they are causal markers. It will not do to simply say that the actual cause is the 
one that is marked as such. 
It might be tempting to conclude that probabilistic theories of actual causation 
must ultimately fail. But there are still reasons for resisting this conclusion. The suc-
cess of probabilistic theories of causal tendencies, together with the presumed con-
nection between causal tendencies and actual causation, should lead us to resist the 
conclusion that actual causation has nothing to do with probability-raising. Even if 
we accept the example of the two gunmen as a direct counterexample to probabilistic 
theories of actual causation, scenarios 4 and 5 suggest that there are cases in which 
the probability pool model articulated by Lewis and Humphreys is appropriate. It 
will still be necessary, then, to map out the boundaries of this form of indeterministic 
causation, where probabilistic theories of causation directly apply. The counter-
example of the second shooter, therefore, is not offered as a call to abandon prob-
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abilistic theories of actual causation, but rather as a call for more work to be done. 
Whatever the result, our picture of causation in an indeterministic world can only 
come into sharper focus. 
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Notes 
I. The condition described is only sufficient, according to Lewis. Since we will be primarily concerned with 
counterexamples to the sufficiency of probability-raising for causation, I will not present the more com-
plex, weakened requirement that Lewis takes to be both necessary and sufficient. 
2. Note, however, that not all of the probabilistic theories of causation mentioned above are intended by 
their authors as theories of actual causation. 
3. Menzies does also mention problems due to "randomly occurring events" (1996, p. 100, n. 24), but he 
does not state clearly what sort of problems he has in mind. 
4. Woodward notes that a similar counterexample is possible without the presence of C2 , if there is some 
probability that an event of type E will occur spontaneously. 
5. For a more detailed critique of causal process theories of causation, see my (1995b). 
6. A similar example is described in Otte (1986); see also my (1998) and Hall, "Two Concepts of Causa-
tion" (chapter 9 in this volume). 
7. Note that this proposal differs slightly from a similar proposal rejected by Lewis (1986b, pp. 204-205). 
That proposal was to move to a more precise specification of events in order admit the existence of cer-
tain causal relations otherwise denied by the theory; (PSE) aims to reject the existence of causal relations 
otherwise admitted by the theory. 
8. If the probabilities remain positive but approach zero in the limit as the actual time of shattering nears, 
then suitable reformulations of the proposals discussed above may succeed. I will not explore this possi-
bility further here. 
9. Schaffer (2000a) presents an example with a similar structure. 
10. This line of thought has been pressed on me independently by Joseph Berkovitz and Jonathan Schaffer. 
See also Hausman (1998), section 13.2. 
